3. Theoretical framework: three competing hypotheses
This piece’s theoretical framework combines three possible readings of the same set of cases, each suggested by a distinct strand of the literature reviewed.
| Hypothesis | Central claim | Main observable prediction |
|---|---|---|
| H1 — low-cost recognition (demand) | Stateless entities actively seek sporting membership because it delivers symbolic recognition cheaper and faster than the diplomatic kind. | Admission cases should cluster among entities of high political salience (contested national identity), with public celebration of entry as quasi-statehood. |
| H2 — institutional inertia (path dependency) | The divergence is mostly administrative inheritance from whoever organised football first (British nations, colonial-era associations), not active demand for recognition today. | Most divergence cases should predate 2004 (the year FIFA shut the door to new non-sovereign members), with few exceptions, and those exceptions should require external legal intervention (CAS) to override the rule. |
| H3 — FIFA’s institutional self-interest (supply) | FIFA has its own incentive to tightly control its membership base — not simply to welcome whoever knocks, but to selectively decide, on political grounds, who gets in. | Cases of both admission AND expulsion/rejection should exist, showing that control runs active in both directions, not a one-way conveyor belt that only receives. |
H1 (low-cost recognition). If H1 carries more weight, the observable pattern should show: (a) the entities that most seek and celebrate sporting membership are exactly the ones with the most contested national identity (Kosovo, Palestine); (b) membership is publicly treated by the entity itself as a quasi-state achievement; (c) demand comes from below (from the entities), not from above (from FIFA).
H2 (institutional inertia). If H2 carries more weight, the observable pattern should show: (a) most divergence cases are pre-2004 inheritance (British nations since FIFA’s founding, Hong Kong since 1954), not new admissions; (b) the post-2004 exceptions (Kosovo, Gibraltar) only occurred because external legal intervention forced FIFA’s hand, not through the entity’s own initiative alone; (c) FIFA itself tried to shut the door with its 2004 statutory change, suggesting that, left to itself, the system would tend to converge with the UN’s map, not diverge from it.
H3 (institutional self-interest). If H3 carries more weight, the observable pattern should show: (a) FIFA and its continental confederations not only admit but also actively expel and reject, on their own political grounds; (b) recognition by another international body (the African Union, for instance) does not guarantee entry, because the final decision belongs to the football system itself; (c) the “sovereignty” criterion is applied selectively, not mechanically.
The three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive: it is plausible that the divergence has institutional origins (H2), that the demand for symbolic recognition is real where it occurs (H1), and that FIFA, in handling that demand, does so under a logic of its own control and self-interest (H3). What this piece tests is the relative weight of each mechanism in each case, not the exclusive presence of one of them.